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ABSTRACT. It is proposed that the recent controversy over “time-symmetric 
quantum counterfactuals” (TSQCs), based on the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz Rule 
for measurements of pre- and post-selected systems, can be clarified by taking 
TSQCs to be counterfactuals with a specific type of compound antecedent. In that 
case, inconsistency proofs such as that of Sharp and Shanks (1993) are not 
applicable, and the main issue becomes not whether such statements are true, but 
whether they are nontrivial. The latter question is addressed and answered in the 
negative. Thus it is concluded that TSQCs, understood as counterfactuals with a 
compound antecedent, are true but only trivially so, 
and provide no new contingent information about specific quantum systems (except 
in special cases already identified in the literature). 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction.  
 
 Time Symmetric Quantum Counterfactuals are claims about the 
probabilities of outcomes of counterfactual (not-actually-performed) 
measurements on “pre- and post-selected” systems: that is,on systems 
identified by two measurement results at two different times ta and tb, instead 
of the usual single pre-selection result at a single time ta. The current 
controversy over Time Symmetric Quantum Counterfactuals (TSQC) has its 
roots in a famous paper by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz (henceforth, 
“ABL”) entitled “Time Symmetry in the Quantum Process of Measurement” 
(1964).  
 The key concept introduced by ABL is that of a “pre- and post-selected 
ensemble,” i.e., an ensemble of systems selected in a time-symmetric way 
via a preselection and then a second, final post-selection. The central result of 
the paper is a time-symmetric expression for the probability of an outcome of 
a measurement performed at a time t between such pre- and postselection 
measurements, subsequently known as the “ABL rule.” 
 The ABL rule is a straightforward consequence of standard quantum 
theory in the case of actually performed measurements at all three times. It 
gives the probability of outcome qj of a nondegenerate observable Q 
measured at a time t between pre- and post-selection in states |a> at time ta 
and |b> at time tb, respectively: (For simplicity and with no loss of generality, 
we consider the case of zero Hamiltonian): 
 
 
∑
=
i ii
jj
j
aqqb
aqqb
baqP
22
22
),|(    (1) 
 
 (1) is essentially a time-symmetric generalization of the von Neumann 
Projection Postulate or “Process 1” (von Neumann 1995). It assumes that 
the density matrix of the system at the intermediate time t is a proper or 
“ignorance”—type mixture of possible eigenstates of Q. 
 In 1985, Albert, Aharonov, and D’Amato (AAD) wrote a paper entitled 
“Curious New Statistical Predictions of Quantum Mechanics” which 
began a program of using the ABL rule to derive various results. This 
paper made a seemingly innocuous but unexamined assumption about the 
applicability of the rule, namely that it could be interpreted as applying 
to measurements that ‘might have been carried out’ (1985, 5). However, 
this apparently natural and innocuous assumption opened up a ‘Pandora’s 
Box’ of controversy as to what kinds of statements are valid to make about 
pre- and post-selected systems. 
 As noted above, the ABL rule was derived on the assumption that the 
outcome whose probability is being calculated corresponds to a measurement 
that was actually performed during the pre- and post-selection 
process. However, AAD presented the ABL rule this way: 
 
“Consider a quantum mechanical system whose Hamiltonian, for simplicity, 
we shall take to be zero. Suppose that this system is measured 
at time ti to be in the state |A = a> (where A represents some complete 
set of commuting observables of the system, and a represents some 
particular set of eigenvalues of those observables), and is measured at 
time tf(tf > ti) to be in the state |B = b>. What do these results imply 
about the results of measurements that might have been carried out 
within the interval (ti > t > tf) between them? It turns out that the 
probability (which was first written down in ABL (1964)) that a measurement 
of some complete set of observables C within that interval, if it were carried 
out, would find that C = cj is 
 
and that formula entails, among other things, that P(a) = P(b) = 1. 
Consequently, these authors maintain that that such a system, within 
such an interval, must have definite, dispersion-free values of both A 
and B, whether or not A and B may happen to commute.” (original italics, 
boldface added for emphasis) (1985, 5)1  
 
 Now, it must be pointed out that this portrayal of the ABL rule is not 
consistent with the original derivation and presentation of the rule by 
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 It should be noted that the case in which the counterfactual measurement is one which 
commutes with either the pre- or post-selection observable is a special one in which the 
corresponding TSQC fulfills a consistent history condition and can therefore be seen as 
uncontroversially valid. What is contested by critics is the general case (any observable 
considered at t). 
ABL. Firstly, the phrases which I have highlighted in boldface, “might 
have been carried out” followed by a subjunctive or counterfactual conditional 
statement of the ABL rule, is the original TSQC-type reading of 
the ABL rule (which one might liken to the key to Pandora’s Box). This 
view of the ABL rule was a seemingly natural but as-yet-unjustified leap 
from the actual, somewhat restrictive assumptions behind the ABL 
derivation— i.e., an intervening measurement actually being performed and 
the process resulting in a pre- and post-selected ensemble depending in 
part on that particular measurement—to a much less constrained situation 
in which the pre- and post-selected ensemble was viewed as a well-defined 
entity in its own right which could be conceptually “held fixed” while the 
intervening measurement was regarded as variable. 
 Assuming that by the words “these authors maintain . . . ”,AAD mean 
ABL, their statement is incorrect. In fact, as observed also by Sharp and 
Shanks (1993, 494, footnote 2) ABL never make any claim in their 1964 
paper about a system having “definite, dispersion-free values” of 
noncommuting observables. 
 A few years later, Sharp and Shanks (1993) gave a proof intended to 
demonstrate that TSQCs give predictions inconsistent with quantum theory. 
Such proofs (Cohen (1995), Miller (1996)) have become part of the 
controversy and will not be addressed in detail in this paper, which aims 
to formulate the question in different (and, hopefully, illuminating) terms.2 
 
 The counterfactual usage of the ABL rule, as proposed by Lev Vaidman 
(cf. 1996–1999) and Ulrich Mohrhoff (cf. 2000, 2001), which I am calling 
a “Time Symmetric Quantum Counterfactual” (TSQC), consists (as in 
AAD) in applying the rule to cases in which Q was not actually measured 
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 For a detailed analysis and defense of the S&S proof, see Kastner (1999a). For Vaidman’s 
response, see Vaidman (1999a). 
at t. Vaidman’s proposed wording of his TSQC is as follows (with minor 
changes in notation to match that used in this paper): 
 
(1V) “If a measurement of an observable Q were performed at time t, 
then the probability for Q = qj would equal PABL(qj), provided that the 
results of measurements performed on the system at times ta and tb are 
fixed” (Vaidman 1999a, 6 (e-print version)).3 
 
Mohrhoff’s is as follows: 
 
(1M) “If a measurement of observable Q were performed on system S 
between the (actual) preparation of the probability measure |a><a| at time 
ta and the (actual) observation of the property |b><b| at time tb, but no 
measurement is actually performed between ta and tb, then the measurement 
of Q would yield qj with probability PABL(qj|a,b)” (Mohrhoff 2001, 865). 
  
 Vaidman (cf. 1996–1999) has used (1V) to obtain what he calls 
“elements of reality” for pre- and post-selected quantum systems. Mohrhoff 
(2000) has used the ABL rule in the form of (1M) to obtain what he terms 
“objective probabilities” for quantum systems. He sees these time-symmetric 
“objective probabilities” as the most informative and epistemologically 
complete kinds of probabilities attributable to quantum systems, in contrast 
to what he terms “subjective probabilities.” The latter are generally time-
asymmetric, and (as he defines them) pertain to situations which fail to take 
into account all facts (such as outcomes of future measurements). Now, 
presumably, in defining quantities such as “elements of reality” and “objective 
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 It should be noted that Vaidman considers the TSQC as applicable to a counterfactual 
measurement in the case when some different observable is actually measured at t. In 
contrast, Mohrhoff restricts his TSQC to the case when no measurement is actually performed 
at t (at least for the applicability of the TSQC for obtaining what he terms “objective 
probabilities”; cf. Mohrhoff 2001). 
probability,” Vaidman and Mohrhoff intend their TSQTs to have a highly 
nontrivial character: i.e., they should give meaningful contingent information 
about specific quantum systems. 
 
2. The Controversy to Date. 
 
 The most recent installment of the controversy over TSQCs involved an 
exchange between myself (Kastner 2001) and Mohrhoff (2001). In Kastner 
(2001) I argued that (1M) fails to get around the proof by Sharp and Shanks 
(1993) (henceforth “S&S”) which showed that predictions obtained from a 
counterfactual usage of the ABL rule conflict with quantum mechanics. The 
problem was that (1M) does nothing to actually “fix” the pre- and post-
selection results in the way TSQC advocates require for evasion of the S&S 
proof (see section 4 below). In Kastner (2001) I suggested that perhaps what 
advocates of TSQCs really had in mind by talk of “fixing” the pre- and post-
selected states of systems subject to TSQC claims was what was referred to 
therein as Statement (1’): 
 
(1’) “Consider system S having pre- and post-selection results a and b 
at times ta and tb when a measurement of observable Q was not performed. 
If a measurement of observable Q had been performed at time t, ta < t < 
tb on S, and if S had the same pre- and post-selection outcomes as above, 
then outcome qj would have resulted with probability PABL(qj|a,b).” 
I noted that (1’) was essentially equivalent to a weaker version of (1M), 
called (2): 
(2) “In the possible world in which observable Q is measured and system 
S yields outcomes a and b at times ta and tb respectively, the probability 
of obtaining result qj at time t is given by PABL(qj|a,b).” 
 
 In his response, Mohrhoff (2001) did not address statement (1’), but 
indicated that he saw no difference between the statements (1M) and (2). 
If (1’) and (2) are equivalent, it appears a reasonable assumption to take 
(1’) as the intended meaning of his TSQC. Taking a TSQC claim to be 
equivalent to statement (1’) means understanding talk about “fixing” pre- and 
post-selection results (such as in Vaidman’s version (1V)) as equivalent 
to the second, italicized “if ”-clause or antecedent in (1’) (since both 
Vaidman and Mohrhoff acknowledge that post-selection results can’t actually 
be “fixed”).4 
 
 It seems that what the TSQC really is, then, is not just a simple 
counterfactual but rather a type of “compound” counterfactual—that is, one 
with a double antecedent. For the immediate purpose of clarifying the 
controversy over the correctness of TSQCs, I shall take (1’) as the intended 
meaning of TSQCs. I shall defer the question of whether the above 
statements differ (I think that (1’) and (2) are equivalent, and that (1) differs 
from both of those), which will be addressed in Section 4. 
 
 Statement (1’) is of course undeniably true: If I were to measure an 
observable that was not actually measured at t, and if the system under 
discussion were pre- and post-selected with the same results as in the actual 
world, then of course the ABL rule would apply to the probabilities of 
outcomes of the not-really-measured observable. I certainly do not disagree 
with this assertion, nor, I think, do any of the other critics of 
                                                 
4 For example, Vaidman says “In the counterfactual world in which a different measurement 
was performed at time t, the state before t is invariably the same, but the state 
after time t is invariably different (if the observables measured in actual and counterfactual 
worlds have different eigenvalues.) Therefore, we cannot hold fixed the quantum 
state of the world in the future.” (Vaidman 1999a, 5 (e-print version)). Mohrhoff, in 
his (2001, 867), says: “Obviously, Dr. X [the experimenter] might not have obtained 
the result |b><b| at the time tb [were the counterfactual intervening measurement 
performed]”. 
TSQCs.5 
 Apparently, then, we have found a statement of the TSQC which is 
true. The trouble is that the addition of the second antecedent makes it 
much too weak to support the kinds of claims being advanced by advocates 
of the TSQC, such as the claim of a nontrivial “objective probability” 
by Mohrhoff, or of “elements of reality” by Vaidman. Why should the 
second antecedent make such a difference to the strength of the 
counterfactual statement? As a starting point, consider an everyday 
counterfactual such as (leaving aside for the moment possible objections that 
everyday counterfactuals can have nothing in common with ostensibly more 
exotic TSQCs, which I will address in the next section): 
 
(A) If there had been a raffle this Wednesday, then nobody would have 
won. 
 
Now, claim (A) is quite a surprising claim, since ordinarily, if one holds 
a raffle, there is almost certainly some winner (if only a sympathy entry 
from the person donating the raffle item). So (A) is quite a strong and 
dramatic and surprising claim as it stands. 
Now consider the following variant of (A): 
 
(A’) If there had been a raffle this Wednesday, and if nobody had 
entered, then nobody would have won. 
 
It is obvious that the addition of the second, auxiliary antecedent, “if 
nobody had entered,” weakens the claim so much as to make it completely 
vacuous. It is, of course, undeniably true, but only trivially so: all it does 
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 The reason we have been critics is because of the claims based on the proposed 
TSQCs; cf. Sections 1 and 4. 
is to restate the raffle rules. That is, it gives no specific information about 
the event under consideration: namely, a particular hypothetical raffle 
possibly held on a specific date, with certain specific potential entrants. But 
what is (A’) other than a version of (A) with certain background conditions 
taken as “fixed”? For, if no raffle takes place on Wednesday, then 
in the actual world, there are no entrants. If we hold this condition fixed, 
then we obtain a consequence that there are no winners in a counterfactual 
raffle. 
 
 The triviality of (A’) is best explained in terms of what is called 
“cotenability” in many theories of counterfactuals. I shall follow Horwich 
(1988, Chapter 10) in describing the concept of cotenability with respect 
to counterfactual statements. The first serious attempt to construct a theory 
of counterfactuals was by Nelson Goodman (1947). Goodman proposed that a 
counterfactual statement of the form 
CF: “If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q,” 
symbolized by 
P □→ Q,     (2) 
is true if and only if the antecedent P, together with certain background 
conditions S holding when P is false, nomologically entail Q; in symbols: 
P&S → Q.     (3) 
This formulation successfully captures the idea that a counterfactual is 
true when the “stage is set” (S) for something (Q) to happen if P were true 
(which it is not). 
However, the notorious problem is in delimiting the background conditions 
S. As Horwich notes, we can make any absurd claim Q by using 
S to create a false conjunction on the left hand side of (3). For example, 
suppose in the actual world it is not raining. Then if I consider that fact 
as background condition S and introduce the antecedent P=not-S=“It 
is raining”, I can obtain the following absurd conclusion: 
 
(4) “If it is raining and not raining, then pigs can fly.” 
 
Statement (4) is vacuously true, but true nonetheless. In order to solve 
this problem, Goodman found that facts allowed in S had to be “cotenable” 
with P, which meant that they could only be those whose truth would 
not be affected by the truth of P. in other words, they had to fulfill the 
requirement 
P □→  S,     (5) 
which unfortunately made Goodman’s definition of counterfactuals circular. 
(Note that (5) would successfully eliminate (4), since one could not 
maintain that “If it were raining, then it would not be raining.”) 
 
Nevertheless, we can apply the cotenability concept to see why (A’) is 
trivial. A counterfactual is considered true because the “stage is set” (S) 
so that one additional event P, if true, leads nomologically to the consequent 
Q. But if the stage setting (S) has any dependence on whether P 
occurs, then the left hand side of (3) could be false, and Q may not occur 
nomologically. 
 In symbols, if S is no longer true when P is true, the conjunction (S&P) 
becomes false. But we needed the truth of (S&P) in order for Q to follow 
nomologically. If (S&P) is false, then any Q whatsoever follows vacuously, 
rather than nomologically, as in example (4). If (S&P) might be false, then 
Q might not follow nomologically, so we can’t assert that it “would”, 
which is what the counterfactual does (see again statement CF, which 
asserts “If it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q,” rather 
than merely “If it were the case that P, then it might be the case that Q”). 
 Now, back to statement (A’). The role of the auxiliary antecedent in 
(A’) is to get around the failure of cotenability between the antecedent (a 
raffle is held) and the background conditions S in place when the antecedent 
is false (nobody enters). Cotenability fails because we cannot assert (5) in 
this case: 
P □→  S 
(where P is “a raffle is held” and S is “there are no entrants”) because 
when raffles are held, people generally enter them. That is, the best we can 
do is to say “If a raffle were held, there might be no entrants,” with S being a 
highly unlikely occurrence. Thus the introduction of the antecedent P affects 
the truth of those background conditions S, so those background conditions 
are not cotenable with P. The only way we can force Q to nomologically follow 
in the form (3) is to stipulate that those background conditions don’t change 
upon introduction of P, despite the fact that they normally would. To do 
this we add an auxiliary antecedent stipulating the certainty of background 
condition(s) S which would not normally be certain. In making such a 
stipulation, we invoke a state of affairs that conflicts with the known 
processes of our world (such as: when raffles are held, people enter them; 
and when measurements are made at time t, outcomes at time tb generally 
don’t occur with certainty but only with some probability dependent on the 
measurement outcome at time t). 
 Note that there can be nontrivial compound counterfactuals, and it is 
not required that the main antecedent and the auxiliary antecedent guarantee 
each other. All that is required for cotenability is that the background 
conditions holding when the antecedent is false (in this case, no 
entrants) have no dependence on the truth of the main antecedent. In the 
specific case of (A’), whether or not there are entrants does depend on 
whether a raffle is held, and that is why cotenability fails and (A’), which 
stipulates background conditions that normally would not hold, becomes 
trivial. 
 The following is an example of a nontrivial compound counterfactual:6 
(B): “If a raffle were held and if three people had entered, then with 
probability x one of them would have won.” 
 In (B), the quantity x can take on different values and in so doing will 
give different information about how the raffle is run (i.e., different rules 
about the nature of the pool of tickets, purchased and unpurchased, from 
which the winning ticket is drawn). Note that the second antecedent in 
(B) is not the background condition S (no entrants) in place when the 
antecedent was false, so it does not have the same structure as (A’) or (1’). 
The crucial point is that in (B), non-cotenable background conditions S 
(no entrants) are not being invoked in order to to obtain the truth of the 
consequent. 
 Here is another compound counterfactual that is nontrivial7: Suppose 
the only people in town this week, besides myself, are such that they buy 
raffle tickets but don’t claim prizes (in other words, only the absentminded 
people are in town). Then one might make the following counterfactual 
claim: 
(C): “If there had been a raffle, and if only I and the absent-minded 
people had entered, then I would have won the raffle.” 
Again, the above is not completely trivial because the second antecedent 
does not serve the purpose of circumventing noncotenability. The background 
condition holding when the antecedent is false (i.e., when no raffle is held) is 
that no one enters the raffle, and this not what the second 
antecedent asserts. But notice that what the second antecedent asserts is 
extremely unlikely (how plausible is it that everyone besides me who enters 
and wins a raffle fails to claim their prize?), and that the ordinarily surprising 
conclusion “I would have won the raffle” is therefore much less 
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 (B) was suggested by an anonymous referee. 
7
 As suggested by another anonymous referee. 
 
surprising. It is less surprising in proportion to the extent that I have 
“tampered” with the background conditions (i.e., tailored them to my 
desired outcome of winning the raffle). 
 To sum up: if the TSQC (1’) is understood as a counterfactual with an 
auxiliary antecedent whose function is to fix the statement of background 
conditions S holding when P is false, where S is not cotenable with the main 
antecedent, it is only trivially true in the same way that (A’ is trivially 
true. 
 Therefore quantities obtained from TSQCs that appear surprising at 
first glance, such as probabilities of unity for outcomes of noncommuting 
observables, are laden with such a heavy burden of conditions that they 
cease to apply to systems under study in any sort of physically meaningful 
way (just as no one cares about the fact that, if nobody entered a raffle, 
then nobody would win). 
 
3. Are TSQCs Immune to the Charge of Vacuity?  
 
The argument thus far has been that a TSQC, understood as (1’)—a 
counterfactual with explicitly “fixed” noncotenable background conditions—
has the structure of statement (A’), which is obviously trivial. Thus it is an 
argument by analogy: the triviality of (A’) underscores the triviality of (1’). 
(In fact it seems to this author that the triviality of (1’) is already clearly 
evident, since the auxiliary antecedent is such a “big if.”) The persuasiveness 
of this argument therefore depends on the strength of the analogy. TSQC 
advocates insist that ordinary counterfactuals are “classical,” and maintain, 
on that basis, that TSQCs are immune from any analogies with ordinary 
counterfactuals. However, this claim will be challenged in what follows. 
 Here we apparently need to address the specific ontologies proposed 
by Vaidman and Mohrhoff, since they both claim that their TSQC proposals 
provide new insights into the nature of the quantum world. Therefore 
they obviously think TSQCs are nonvacuous. Thus our task boils 
down to deciding whether quantum systems and the physics describing 
them, according to TSQC proponents, makes them immune to the triviality 
of stating that if no one entered a counterfactual raffle, then no one 
would win. 
 For starters, then, let us first adopt Mohrhoff’s viewpoint, which, as I 
understand it from his (2000) and (2001), is characterised by the following 
key beliefs: 
 
a. No time index applies to unobserved quantum systems. 
b. No intrinsic properties are possessed by unobserved quantum systems. 
The only time that a system can be said to “possess” a property 
is when a measurement with a definite outcome has occurred. 
c. There is no “flow” of time at the microscopic level, either forward 
or backward. 
d. There is no real difference between past, present, and future. 
e. There is no causality. 
 
 It should be noted that (a) through (e) constitute a basic metaphysical 
position concerning events in time, and that Mohrhoff’s claims about objective 
probabilities are secondary to these basic assumptions. Therefore 
Mohrhoff sees his usage of the ABL rule in deriving what he calls “objective 
probabilities” as justified by these assumptions. 
The task now becomes to understand why, or if, beliefs (a) through (e) 
should make Statement (1’) any less vacuous than (A’). In other words, 
since everyone surely agrees that the statement concerning a “counterfactual 
raffle” with fixed background conditions, (A’), is vacuous, we need 
to see whether beliefs (a) through (e) serve to make statement (1’) immune 
from the same kind of vacuity. (The latter is essentially what Mohrhoff 
has argued in his defense of his usage of the ABL rule, which is why I feel 
compelled to address it here). So let us catalog the differences (according 
to Mohrhoff’s ontological assumptions): 
 It is generally assumed that a raffle consists of physical systems that 
always have observable properties (i.e., possessed properties, as defined 
according to (b)). Two considerations arise: (i) it need not be the case that 
the systems involved in the raffle are classical systems, and (ii) even if it 
did, does the fact that a raffle involves observable (possessed) properties, 
causality and time flow throughout the interval [ta, tb] have a bearing on 
whether (1’) is as vacuous as (A’)? 
 In support of (i), consider a quantum raffle. It goes like this: at ta (say, 
Monday), there are N possible entrants (each of which could be some sort 
of device rather than a person). (We require that N be nonzero, otherwise 
it makes no sense to consider any kind of raffle, whether actual or not. 
Thus the number N becomes a component of the raffle rules.) Each 
prospective entrant holds a quantum coin. If no raffle is held at time t 
(Wednesday), the coin remains in an unflipped ready state. If a raffle is 
held at time t, a signal is sent to each of the N prospective entrants which 
triggers a coin flip. For each coin flip that comes up heads, there is an 
entrant. (We need not concern ourselves with how a winner is chosen from 
the pool of entrants; our question concerns only whether or not there is a 
winner.) At time tb (say, Friday), the number of entrants M is recorded. 
Obviously, when M =0, there is no winner. 
 Now, when there is no raffle, there are no coin flips, therefore none 
comes up heads, therefore M = 0 and there is no winner. Statement (A’) 
asserts the obvious: namely, if a counterfactual raffle were held and if none 
of the coin flips came up heads, there would be no winner. 
 I would argue that the counterfactual quantum raffle described is 
isomorphic, in every relevant sense, to the situation considered in a TSQC. 
(Note that I am not claiming that the quantum raffle is the same procedure 
as in a TSQC; obviously it is not. All I am claiming is that the general 
form of the claim corresponds in every relevant sense to the TSQC.) First, 
regarding the quantum raffle: we have an empirical fact at ta (Monday): 
the number N of prospective entrants. Prior to tb (Friday), there is no fact 
of the matter as to possessed properties of the quantum coins (ready, heads 
or tails), since they are not being measured (according to Mohrhoff’s 
ontology). Only at time tb do we measure the coins and find out how many 
(M) are in heads states. We then note that M=0, and conclude that, had 
a raffle been performed and if the same outcomes had obtained at ta and tb, 
then no one would have won the raffle. 
 In the TSQC case, we have an empirical fact at ta: the outcome of the 
pre-selection measurement. Prior to tb, there is no fact of the matter as to 
what properties the system has, since it is not being measured (again, 
according to Mohrhoff’s ontology). Only at time tb do we measure the system 
and find out which eigenvalue of the post-selection observable obtains at that 
time. We are then in a position to input the outcomes observed at ta and tb 
into the ABL rule and conclude that, had a measurement of Q been performed 
at t, and if the same outcomes had obtained at ta and bb, then the 
probabilities of eigenvalues of Q would have been as given by the ABL rule. 
 One might find a difference in that the output of the TSQC applies to 
an outcome at time t (prior to tb) while the outcome of the raffle seems to 
apply to time tb (Friday). Against this, we reply that, assuming time 
symmetry and/or a lack of time index in either case—remember, this is a 
quantum raffle with a time-symmetric, antirealist ontology—that the raffle 
outcome can be seen as applying at time t, just as in the TSQC. Therefore 
those holding the raffle might not discover the bad news until Friday, but 
one can apply time-symmmetry to argue that “in fact” there was no winner 
prior to Friday (or, to put it slightly differently, that there was fated to be 
no winner prior to Friday). 
 One could also, of course, point out that the quantum raffle is a 
slightly different kind of experimental procedure than the usual situation 
considered in a TSQC. But again, this difference is superficial. To see 
this, let’s fill out the details in a possible quantum raffle. Assume a three 
dimensional Hilbert space for which the “ready,” “heads,” and “tails” 
states form a basis. Then a raffle taking place at t corresponds to a unitary 
evolution of the ready state to a state which is an equal superposition 
of the heads and tails states, call it the “flipped” state  
( 1/√2 [|heads> + |tails>]). At tb, a measurement of an observable with 
outcomes [heads] or [notheads] is performed. 
 So the raffle differs from the usual TSQT in that there is a unitary 
evolution between t and tb if the raffle is held; but since such an evolution 
is fully time symmetric, the difference in no way disqualifies the example 
as a fair analogy. 
 But, considering point (ii), suppose there really is no fully time 
symmetric, nonclassical raffle? Suppose there must always be some 
“classical” component, whether a possessed property, a temporal direction, a 
causal influence, involved in processes leading to statements such as (A’)? So 
what? While both Mohrhoff and Vaidman have insisted that certain 
“behind-the-scenes” features of quantum systems (i.e., questions of how it 
happens that a system ends up with one outcome or another at times ta or 
tb) are what immunize TSQCs from comparisons with everyday 
counterfactuals, no reason has been given for thinking that such behind-the-
scenes features have any bearing on the legitimacy of the counterfactual 
claims under consideration. On the contrary, I show below that Mohrhoff’s 
own definitions of his proposed applications of the ABL rule imply that behind-
the-scenes features precisely fail to immunize TSQCs from comparison with 
everyday counterfactuals. 
 In his (2001), Mohrhoff invokes behind-the-scenes considerations as 
crucial to the validity of his TSQC. That is, he (and Vaidman, as noted 
above) rejects arguments against his TSQC if they seem to be based on 
everyday, “classical” counterfactuals (such as my statements A and A’) 
which, he assumes, invariably involve systems that always possess properties 
during the time interval [ta, tb]. Specifically, he states that TSQCs 
differ fundamentally from ordinary “classical” counterfactuals (such as 
A) because the latter involve systems with determinate properties and the 
former involves systems with indeterminate properties unless measured: 
“While a classical counterfactual assumes that something obtains 
whereas in reality something else obtains, a quantum counterfactual assumes 
that something obtains where in reality nothing obtains” (Mohrhoff 
2001, note 23). 
 But by this definition, Mohrhoff’s own “subjective” counterfactual usage 
of the ABL rule would constitute a “classical counterfactual” which 
would therefore be disqualified from comparison with his TSQC: 
“In principle, both rules [Born and ABL] have an objective as well as 
a subjective application. If Q is actually measured, both rules assign 
probabilities that are subjective inasmuch as they are based on probability 
measures that fail to take account of at least one relevant fact—the result 
of the measurement of Q” (Mohrhoff 2001, 865). 
 In the case of what Mohrhoff terms the “subjective” counterfactual 
application of the ABL rule, in reality “something else obtains” at t. Now, 
the “subjective” counterfactual application of the ABL rule is clearly some 
kind of TSQC (though not yielding what Mohrhoff would term “objective 
probabilities”). Therefore he cannot coherently disallow (A’) as a valid 
analogy with TSQCs based on the fact that the former might involve systems 
with determinate behind-the-scenes features. 
 In any case, it must be reiterated (recall point (i) above) that it is 
perfectly possible that an “ordinary” counterfactual statement such as A’ can 
always be replaced by a suitably “indeterminate” version (such as a quantum 
raffle) and that the resulting statement is clearly just as vacuous. But 
(ignoring for the moment the subjective ABL counterfactual claim of 
Mohrhoff which shows (i) to be unnecessary anyway), even if (i) should 
prove difficult to fulfill, anyone with a universally antirealist ontology can 
do this for ordinary classical processes merely by asserting esse est percipi. 
Then (A’) involves indeterminate properties just as much as (1’) does. But 
I doubt that even Bishop Berkeley would regard Statement (A’) as 
nonvacuous. 
 The fact that, no matter what one does with one’s ontological 
assumptions, (A’) remain just as trivial, should be taken as a good indication 
that varying one’s ontological assumptions are not sufficient to 
rescue (1’) (which has the same form as (A’)) from vacuity. 
What about a possible objection that the thing that saves (1’) from 
vacuity is precisely the ABL rule (as opposed to some other kind of rule, 
like that of the raffle)? That would mean that counterfactual statements 
with a compound antecedent, such as (A’), are indeed trivial unless the 
underlying rule is the ABL rule. But against this, it is clearly the form of 
the statement, not the content, which makes it vacuous. To put it differently, 
the computational rule is not what is at issue; rather it is the contingent, 
empirical numbers (arising from assumed background conditions) 
input in the rule that are at issue. Therefore the precise nature of the 
specific computational rule has no bearing on whether the statement is 
vacuous. 
Thus, denying all properties, time, and causality between measurements 
does nothing to emeliorate the vacuity of (1’), because its vacuity stems 
only from the necessity to add an extra condition, and not from any assumed 
macroscopic, classical, determinate attributes. The extra condition 
is required simply because there are facts that require “fixing” for the 
consequent to follow, but which are physically not fixed (the latter fact 
being acknowledged by proponents of TSQCs). This has nothing to do 
with whether or not one subscribes to the beliefs (a) through (e); it is simply 
the violation of cotenability between those facts and the antecedent 
(Mohrhoff, in 2001, has denied a cotenability problem for TSQCs, but his 
argument is flawed; a detailed refutation is presented below in Section 5). 
 It should be noted that Mohrhoff’s tenseless view of facts—i.e., that a 
statement such as “X is true at time tb” should be seen as holding at all 
other times—fails to accomplish the kind of counterfactual fixing he seeks. 
This is because, if we are going to consider a counterfactual event at t— 
an event that might have occurred but didn’t—then, to be consistent with 
physical law, we also have to consider possible outcomes at either ta or tb 
other than the actual ones, that might have occurred but didn’t. Mohrhoff 
acknowledges these other possible outcomes but calls them “irrelevant,” 
which can only be justified if his TSQC contains the second antecedent 
appearing in (1’), which explicitly instructs us to disregard them. But the 
second antecedent removes the need for any arguments that facts are 
untensed and therefore fixed, since said facts—whether tensed or untensed— 
are being “fixed” by the additional antecedent, which throws out the 
unwanted possible outcomes, in either case. 
 The present author is currently agnostic regarding tensed vs. untensed 
views of facts, and wishes merely to point out that the untensed view does 
nothing to accomplish the goal of obtaining counterfactually fixed events 
at times ta and tb in the absence of the second antecedent (without violating 
quantum theory—in which case the ABL rule would not hold anyway, 
since it is nothing more than a deductive consequence of quantum theory). 
We turn briefly now to Vaidman’s ontology, which differs from Mohrhoff 
’s in that it assumes a bi-directional causal flow: one in the reversed 
time direction originating from the measurement at tb, along with the usual 
“retarded” causal flow originating at ta. But such metaphysical precepts 
concern what happens “behind the scenes,” and I have already argued 
that whatever goes on behind the scenes has no bearing on the vacuity of 
the counterfactual claim. Whether or not there is reversed causal flow from 
tb, the fact remains that the post-selection result at tb is not actually 
physically fixed (as Vaidman readily admits; see footnote 4), and this makes 
Vaidman’s TSQC also isomorphic to statements (1’) and (A’). 
Thus, if TSQCs are properly understood as Statement (1’)—and I think 
they clearly are, as argued above—then they are completely vacuous. All 
they do is to restate the ABL rule, providing no contingent information 
about the specific systems under study. In the same way, statement (A’) 
tells us nothing substantive about the nature of the specific people, devices, 
or raffle-holding entity, in place during the time interval in question [ta, tb] 
(Monday through Friday), but merely restates the raffle rules. 
 
4. Are Statements (1) and (1’) Different?  
 
Recall that (1) has two variants: Mohrhoff’s version, which I am calling (1M), 
and Vaidman’s version, which I am calling (1V) (although Vaidman’s TSQC is 
really closer in wording to (1’)). Let us first consider (1M). Statement (1M) 
fails to correctly convey the meaning of the TSQC—if the intended TSQC is 
truly (1’)—because it contains only a single antecedent, and lacks any 
statement of the necessary additional condition (the auxiliary antecedent) 
required for the validity of the claim. It merely restates (i) that the 
measurement at t is not performed in the actual world (redundant since we 
already know that the statement is counterfactual) and (ii) the pre- and post-
selectionmresults occurring in the actual world, which we also already know. 
Thus (1M) is completely equivalent to the single-antecedent counterfactual: 
(3) If I had measured Q at t, then the probability of outcome qk would 
be as given by the ABL rule. 
 
(3) is a stronger claim than (1’), in the way that (A) is a stronger claim 
than (A’). That is, (3) and (A) are highly nontrivial (but generally false) 
counterfactual claims. Both of these omit the auxiliary antecedent condition 
required for the truth of the claim (but which also makes the claim 
trivial). (A) is obviously false; (3) is false as shown by the S&S proof. That is, 
in failing to explicitly “fix” the required outcome at tb, (3) permits the 
application of the Sharp and Shanks inconsistency proof which demonstrates 
that such claims (in general) contradict quantum mechanics. Therefore 
(3), which would unambiguously do the work desired by Vaidman 
and Mohrhoff (in giving us “surprising” probabilities and/or specific contingent 
objective probabilities) is (generally) false. 
 
 As for (1V), as noted above, if we understand the “fixing” requirement 
as equivalent to the additional condition referred to in the auxiliary 
counterfactual antecedent, then (1V) is simply equivalent to (1’). It is 
therefore 
vacuous, meaning that quantities derived from it do not really apply to 
specific systems in the way in which it has been claimed. Criticisms of (1V) 
can be seen as directed to claims based on (1V), rather than to the vacuously 
true nature of (1V) itself. That is, either (i) TSQC proponents have 
essentially been proposing (3), which is false and therefore not applicable 
to quantum systems; or they have been proposing (1’), which is vacuous 
and therefore also yields no valid information about specific quantum 
systems. In either case, what continues to be invalid is the use to which 
(1V) has been put in supporting claims such as that one can “Ascertain 
the Values of σx, σy, and σz of a Spin-1⁄2 Particle,” (Vaidman, Aharonov, 
and Albert 1987) and other “surprising” effects (cf. Vaidman (1996b, 900– 
901). The 1987 title itself explicitly attributes values obtained from 
counterfactual usages of the ABL rule (i.e., values corresponding to 
observables that were not measured) to a single system. 
 In another example, according to Vaidman and Mohrhoff, the ABL 
rule can be applied both conventionally and counterfactually to a particular 
individual particle in the “Three-Box” experiment, yielding the “surprising” 
(Vaidman) or “objective” (Mohrhoff) result that the particular 
particle’s probability of being located in box A is unity and its probability 
of being located in box B is unity, when only one or the other measurement 
(opening either box A or box B) is actually performed. Clearly that would 
be surprising and substantive information, but the ABL probability of 
unity corresponding to the measurement that was not performed—the 
counterfactual one—depends crucially on an auxiliary “if” clause fixing 
non-cotenable selection results, just as the surprising result of statement 
(A)—that no one would win a counterfactual raffle—depends crucially on 
fixing the non-cotenable background condition that nobody enters a raffle. 
In both cases, the “surprising” result ceases to be surprising or objectively 
applicable to the specific particle (raffle) once the background conditions 
are fixed “by hand” in this way. The above kinds of specific claims which 
depend upon TSQCs are thus seen to be invalid, even if the TSQC can 
escape the Sharp & Shanks proof in the formulation (1’). 
 
5. Cotenability Violation Not Addressed by Mohrhoff Argument.  
 
In Section 2, I described how TSQCs are made trivial because they invoke an 
auxiliary antecedent to circumvent the fact that the necessary background 
conditions (both the pre- and post-selection outcomes) are not cotenable 
with the antecedent (a counterfactual measurement at t). Mohrhoff denies 
a problem with cotenability, and in his (2001) uses the impossibility of 
superluminal signaling in an EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) experiment 
as an analogy. 
 Before turning to that analogy, it should be noted that Mohrhoff’s 
discussion misconstrues the meaning of cotenability as something much 
weaker than it is. He assumes that background conditions need only be 
consistent with a counterfactual event to satisfy cotenability, but this is 
not what cotenability means. To use the raffle as an example, the back 
ground condition of there being no raffle entrants (M = 0) is physically 
consistent with a counterfactual raffle, but not cotenable with it. It is 
consistent because it is possible (though highly unlikely) that no one would 
enter a raffle held on Wednesday. (I.e., as noted in Section 2, one can 
truthfully say “If a raffle were held, there might not be any entrants.”) 
However, it is not cotenable because its (counterfactual, not actual) truth 
depends on whether or not a raffle is held; because when there are raffles, 
people enter them (or quantum devices flip coins). Cotenability is a much 
stronger requirement than mere consistency between background conditions 
and counterfactual events. As discussed above (refer to expression 
(5)), it requires that there be no counterfactual dependence of those 
background conditions on the truth of the antecedent. 
 To return to Mohrhoff’s analogy: in the famous example of a perfectly 
anticorrelated pair of spin 1/2 particles separated by a spacelike distance 
and measured by Alice and Bob, superluminal signaling is impossible because, 
as Mohrhoff says, “it is impossible for Bob not only to determine 
the spin component measured by Alice but also to find out whether or not 
any spin component is measured by Alice” (Mohrhoff 2001, note 21). This, 
of course, is because no initial information concerning spin orientation is 
available from the density matrix of each of the particles, which is just 
proportional to the identity. 
 Mohrhoff claims that an exactly analogous situation holds in a timelike 
sense as applied to a counterfactual measurement at time t, and that 
therefore there is no violation of cotenability between the background 
conditions holding at ta and tb and a counterfactual measurement at time t 
(loosely speaking, that those background conditions are unaffected by 
such a measurement). However, this analogy is flawed. 
The precise analogy drawn by Mohrhoff is the following: instead of 
two anticorrelated particles separated by a spacelike distance, we have a 
single particle perfectly correlated with itself (in terms of spin direction) 
at two different times. Mohrhoff assumes that Alice might make a 
measurement at t and Bob makes the post-selection measurement at tb, and 
notes that it is impossible for him to tell, based on his measurement, 
whether Alice made a measurement at t. But this analogy is false, because 
it neglects the known pre-selection at time ta—which, unlike the 
uninformative initial state of the anticorrelated particles of the EPR case, 
contains very specific information about spin orientation. Given a known 
preselection, say |a>, if Bob measures the observable A at time tb and 
obtains a result other than a, then he knows with certainty that Alice made a 
measurement of a noncommuting observable at time t. Therefore Alice’s 
measurement certainly “disturbs” the particle in the way that Mohrhoff denies 
throughout his (2001). Ironically, Mohrhoff makes exactly this point (in 
slightly different terms) in the previous note (Mohrhoff 2001, note 20). 
 
 The phenomenon that I discuss above and that Mohrhoff discusses in 
his note 20 is most dramatically observed in the case of photons encountering 
crossed polarizers. If one places a polarizer oriented along, say, 
direction x at point a and another oriented exactly opposite to it at point 
b, then no photons will pass the second polarizer. (Think of this as the 
actual experiment, with no measurement at t.) But if one were to place a 
polarizer in between the first two, at an oblique angle to both (a 
counterfactual measurement at t), photons would be able to pass the second 
polarizer. Thus anyone post-selecting photons through a measurement at 
point b can determine whether someone has inserted a third polarizer in 
between a and b. This is exactly a violation of cotenability: an intervening 
event renders previous background conditions uncertain. 
 
6. Conclusion: TSQCs Are either False or Vacuous.  
 
If one takes the TSQC as (1M), it is false because it fails to state the extra 
condition (auxiliary antecedent) needed for the consequent to follow 
nomologically (as stated, the consequent does not follow). The Sharp and 
Shanks proof (1993), 
which assumes no auxiliary antecedent, can be understood as a proof of 
the falsity of (1M). Objections by both Mohrhoff and Vaidman to the 
S&S proof seem to turn on the issue of whether or not the proof has taken 
into account the “fixity” of pre- and post-selection results, so those objections 
can be seen as supporting (1’) as an accurate statement of their 
TSQC. If one takes the TSQC as (1’), the Sharp and Shanks proof does 
not apply; the TSQC is then true, but only trivially so. It does nothing but 
restate the ABL rule, and cannot be considered as providing information 
about specific systems as claimed. Metaphysical precepts concerning the 
reality (or lack thereof) of quantum systems, time, or properties between 
measurements have no bearing whatsoever on these conclusions, which 
are based solely on the empirically observable conditions necessary for the 
consequent to follow from the stated antecedent(s). 
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